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Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) consists of spatially distributed autonomous sensors 
used to monitor physical or environmental conditions such as temperature, sound, vibrations, etc. 
co-operatively [1]. These sensors are finding applications in diverse fields such as in the 
battlefield, healthcare, space etc. A WSN consists of collections of nodes and a base station. The 
sensors, which are miniature computers, have very basic functionalities with interfaces and 
components. The base station acts as a gateway between the sensor nodes and the end users, 
forwarding the data collected from the sensor nodes to a server. It has much more computational 
energy and communication resources than that of an individual sensor node. 
The network is assumed to be a large static wireless sensor network, where the resources 
of all the sensor nodes are identical. The sensor nodes use multi-hop routing to communicate with 
the base, as they can only communicate directly with their neighboring nodes. The routing 
protocols for sensor networks are distributed and reactive. One such protocol used in our work is 
the Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol, which was initially designed 
for wireless ad-hoc networks, but has been used to meet the specific needs of sensor networks [2]. 
The sensor nodes may vary in size and the cost is similarly variable depending on the 
complexity of the individual sensor nodes.  Size and cost constraints on sensor nodes result in 
corresponding constraints on resources such as energy, memory, computational speed and 
communications bandwidth. The basic philosophy behind WSNs is that, while the capability of 
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each individual sensor node is limited, the aggregate power of the entire network is sufficient for 
the required mission. 
1.1 Security in WSNs 
The simplicity of Wireless Sensor Networks with resource constrained nodes makes them 
extremely vulnerable to variety of attacks. Attackers can eavesdrop on radio transmissions, inject 
bits in the channel, replay previously heard packets and do much more. Securing WSNs is crucial 
as they may operate in a hostile environment. Securing the Wireless Sensor Network needs to 
make the network support all security properties: confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and 
availability [3]. But the constrained computation and communication capability of sensor nodes 
make the use of many traditional security methodologies such as encryption, complex 
cryptographic techniques, key management, etc., difficult or impossible to use. 
Attackers may deploy a few malicious nodes with similar hardware capabilities as 
legitimate nodes that might collude to attack the system cooperatively. Also, in some cases 
colluding nodes might have high-quality communications links available for coordinating their 
attack. Sensor nodes may not be tamper resistant and if an adversary compromises a node, it can 
extract all key material, data, and code stored on that node [4]. Extremely effective tamper 
resistance tends to add significant per-unit cost, and sensor nodes are intended to be very 
inexpensive. 
Some attacks such as wormhole attacks, where a pair of colluding attackers record 
packets at one end and replay them at another location using a private high speed network, pose a 
severe threat against packet routing that is particularly challenging to detect and prevent, as they 
use a private, out-of-band channel invisible to the underlying sensor network. The wormhole 
attack can severely deteriorate the performance and compromise the security of a sensor network 
through exploiting the routing protocols. These attacks are immune to cryptographic techniques, 
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as the attacker does not need to decode encrypted packets to be able to replay them. It is even 
more difficult to defend against when combined with sinkhole attacks, where nearly all the traffic 
from a particular area is lured through a compromised node, creating a sinkhole with the 
adversary at the centre [5]. 
In a wireless sensor network, some sensor nodes might want to communicate with the 
base station in order to send data/information. A pair of attackers, with their high speed private 
wormhole link, can create an illusion that these sensor nodes are only a few hops away from the 
base station. Thus the sensor nodes will eventually choose this shortest path through the attacker 
to send data packets to the base. Thus all traffic from these sensor nodes will be lured towards the 
attackers, who thereby gain access to important data flowing through the network.  
Thus in the presence of a wormhole attack, our objective to protect the network is two-fold: 
1. To find an alternate path for the sensor nodes that wants to communicate with the base, 
while avoiding the wormhole; 
2. To waste the attacker’s resources 
The network is protected by responding to an attacker by retaliating in some form. The 
objective is two-fold as identified above. An appropriate response can take many forms. For 
example, if one part of the network is collecting critical data, the objective will be to prevent the 
attacker from moving to that part of the network, while inflicting some cost on the attacker (such 
as wasted energy). A more brute force type of retaliation would simply try to flood the attacker’s 
area of the network so that the attacker enters a Denial of Service mode and is not able to function 
properly. It is important to note that our approach is a complement to more traditional security 
mechanisms and is not a substitute for them. 
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1.2 Proposed Approach 
The network consists of three types of nodes, besides the attacker. There are a large 
numbers of tiny sensors which are very resource constrained in terms of processing, computation 
and storage. Secondly, Distributed Retaliation Agents (DRAs) which although fewer in number, 
are more powerful connecting or switching devices such as Stargates [6] or FitPCs [7]. These are 
typically used in sensor networks to interconnect sensor clusters for example. There is also a 
single powerful base station. We assume that the wormhole attack has been identified by the 
intrusion detection system, and that the attacker cannot change the underlying AODV routing 
protocol.  
AODV is a multi-hop routing protocol where sensor nodes can only communicate with 
its neighbors directly. A node broadcasts route requests (RREQ) to discover a route to the base to 
send data. The base responds with a route reply (RREP) for the first RREQ from a node, which is 
unicasted back to the requesting node, in the same route that the RREQ reached the base. The 
node sends data through the route for which it received a RREP. With the high speed wormhole 
link, the RREP reaches the source first through the attacker route. Thus the source ends up 
sending data through the attacker, who thereby gains access to the data.  
The retaliation takes place in three phases. 
Phase I: Prepare Environment  
Once the attack has been identified, the environment is prepared for retaliation by DRAs. 
The candidate nodes which are capable of starting the retaliation process must be within the 
communication range of the attackers. An overlap density based selection method is used by the 
DRA to select the nodes that actually perform the retaliation called sacrificial nodes. This 
selection should be hidden from the attacker; thus DRA should not directly communicate with the 
attacker. This means that the nodes between the DRA and the attacker are two-hop neighbors. If 
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the distance between the DRA and the attacker gets shorter, the intersection area between the two 
will get bigger. This increases the probability that there is a sacrificial node in the intersection 
area A. 
As the sacrificial nodes have limited power source, their effective working area of the 
sacrificial nodes will shrink over time. Thus the DRA should add more sacrificial nodes if the 
probability that the attacker is within the communication range of at least one sacrificial node 
falls below a set threshold. 
Phase II: Respond 
The wormhole attack is a sophisticated attack where the attacker creates a fake path to the 
destination (base station) to gain access to the data. We assume that the attacker cannot modify 
the underlying AODV protocol. There are two types of nodes in the network: one that 
communicates normally with the attacker sending packets (Type A) and while the other is 
sacrificial nodes that were not communicating, but sends a RREQ packet to the attacker after the 
attack is detected and receives a RREP (Type B) packet in return.  
With the high speed wormhole link, that attacker can make the RREP from the base to 
reach the defender node D1 first. A response is successful if the sacrificial nodes can find an 
alternate path, different from the attacker route, for the defender node to send an actual data 
packet to the base. To achieve this, we need to find the probability that a given RREP through the 
attacker route is intended for the defender, with the assumption that he can handle all packets, 
represented as 1|	
, where PA is the number of packets flowing through the attacker 
and 1 is the route reply packet for the defender. The sacrificial nodes should aim to saturate 
the capacity/bandwidth of the attacker, so that 1|	
 decreases, as the attacker gets busy 
processing the fake RREQs from the sacrificial nodes. 
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As the sacrificial nodes are not aware of the attacker’s capacity, the number of sacrificial 
nodes may have to be increased in order to overload the attacker. A congestion estimator is used 
to monitor the capacity of the attacker at any time. If the bandwidth is low, the attacker is 
overloaded and 1|	
 decreases. If the bandwidth is very high, then the attacker is not 
overloaded. This means that 1|	
 is high and hence the number of RREQs or the 
sacrificial nodes has to be increased.  
After the number of sacrificial nodes has been increased, the bandwidth is calculated 
again to check if even more sacrificial nodes are needed. The probability is calculated again at the 
end of a time window whose size is equal to the time of flight measure, as the sacrificial nodes 
aim to find an alternate path within the lifetime (round trip time from sending of RREQ and the 
arrival of RREP) of the packet. 
The outline of the rest of the thesis is given as follows: 
In chapter 2, the literature review is presented. The actual working of the AODV routing 
protocol is discussed in chapter 3. The outline for our proposed approach is given in chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 elaborates the method proposed to respond to a wormhole attack, in particular we 
present algorithms to prepare the environment for retaliation and algorithms for appropriate 
response to a wormhole attack. Chapter 6 presents simulation results to validate our approach and 






REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
2.1 Security in Sensor Networks 
Research on providing security solutions for WSNs has focused mainly in four categories: 
1) Key management: 
 A lot of work has been done [8] in establishing cryptographic keys between nodes to 
enable encryption and authentication. But these methods are complex and computationally too 
intensive, depleting the limited energy available to the sensor nodes. 
2) Authentication and Secure Routing:  
Several protocols [9] have been proposed to protect information from being revealed to 
an unauthorized party and guarantee its integral delivery to the base station. Marti et al. [10] and 
Buchegger and Boudec [11] consider the problem of minimizing the effect of misbehaving or 
selfish nodes on routing through punishment, reporting, and holding grudges. The application of 
these techniques to sensor networks is promising, but these protocols are vulnerable to 
blackmailers.  
Perrig et al. [12] propose SPINS: Secure routing protocols for WSN, which has two 
building block security protocols optimized for use in sensor networks, SNEP and µTESLA.  
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SNEP provides confidentiality, authentication, and freshness between nodes and the sink, and 
µTESLA provides authenticated broadcast. 
3) Secure services:  
In a secure localization technique (SerLoc) [13] nodes can use the location information 
broadcasted by guards to determine their own position following some principles. But its 
functionality relies on the correct operation of the distinguished guard nodes, and an attacker can 
easily bypass the defense mechanism by compromising these guards.  
A secure aggregation protocol for cluster-based WSN has been proposed in 
[14].  Aggregation can be seen as the process by which data sent from sensors to the base station 
are little-by-little processed by some nodes called aggregator nodes. Aggregators collect data 
from surrounding nodes and produce a small sized output, thus preventing all nodes in the 
network from sending their data to the base. This protocol does not rely on trusted aggregator 
nodes and thus is immune to aggregators compromising. In addition to security performance, it 
has a low transmission overhead. 
A secure time synchronization toolbox has been proposed in [15] to counter attacks. This 
toolbox includes protocols for secure pair-wise and group synchronization of nodes that lie in 
each other’s power ranges and of nodes that are separated by multiple hops. 
4) Intrusion Detection:  
Da Silva et al. [16] and Onat and Miri [17] propose similar IDS systems, where certain 
monitor nodes in the network are responsible for monitoring their neighbors, looking for 
intruders. They listen to messages in their radio range and store in a buffer specific message fields 
that might be useful to an IDS system running within a sensor node, but no details are given how 
this system works. In these architectures, there is no collaboration among the monitor nodes. 
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Loo et al. [2] and Bhuse and Gupta [18] describe two more IDSs for routing attacks in 
sensor networks. Both papers assume that routing protocols for ad hoc networks can also be 
applied to WSNs: Loo et al. [2] assume the AODV (Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector) 
protocol while Bhuse and Gupta [18] use the DSDV and DSR protocols. Then, specific 
characteristics of these protocols are used like “number of route requests received” to detect 
intruders. 
2.2 Security for Wormhole Attack in Sensor Networks 
Packet leashes proposed by Hu et al [19] are the most commonly cited wormhole 
prevention mechanisms. The general idea is to add a secure constraint (leash), such as timing or 
location information, to each packet. This information acts as the metric for calculating whether 
the packet traveled a distance larger than physically possible. This needs a special hardware for 
localization and synchronization. However the use of technology like GPS significantly limits the 
life expectancy of such a network with resource constraints. 
Capkun et al [20] and have proposed authenticated distance bounding protocols for 
ensuring that nodes claiming to be located close together really are. They calculate the distance 
between two participating nodes by measuring the round trip travel time of a challenge (message 
and its acknowledgement) and determine whether the estimated distance is within the maximum 
possible communication range. The main problem is that the wireless medium introduces random 
delays between the time a packet is sent and the actual time it is transmitted via the radio 
interface. 
Lazos et al [21] also proposed a solution for calculating the distance between a pair of 
nodes based on the location information of a few nodes called guards. The basic idea is that nodes 
can use the location information broadcasted by the guards to determine their own position 
following some principles. This approach is showed to successfully detect a wormhole with 
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probability close to one. However, its functionality relies on the correct operation of the 
distinguished guard nodes, and an attacker can bypass the defense mechanism by compromising 
these guards.  
Hu et al [22] have proposed a solution in which all nodes are equipped with directional 
antennas. Each node has to examine the direction of received signals from its neighbor. Thus a 
pair of nodes can participate in a cooperation scheme where they share directional information to 
prevent wormhole endpoints from masquerading as false neighbors. There is also a witness node 
to confirm the above said relation. This can be applied only to networks that use directional 
antennas. Also the presence of this witness node can lead to the failure of the protocol since it can 
be easily compromised by an attacker.  
Wang et al [23] have proposed an approach in which each sensor estimates the distance 
to its neighbors using the received signal strength. All sensors send this distance information to 
the central controller, which calculates the network’s physical topology based on individual 
sensor distance measurements. If the estimated distance between the two nodes connected by a 
wormhole is much larger than the node’s communication range, it leads to the detection of the 
attack in progress.  This technique is susceptible to distance estimation errors especially for 
sparsely located network nodes. Also, its centralized nature limits its applicability in sensor 
networks since most of the times we are dealing with networks that operate in unattended 
environments. 
Khalil et al [24] have proposed a protocol called LiteWorp for wormhole attack discovery 
in static networks. In LiteWorp, once deployed, nodes obtain full two-hop, rather than one-hop, 
routing information from their neighbors. This information can be exploited to detect a 
wormhole. Also, nodes observe their neighbor’s behavior to determine whether data packets are 
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being properly forwarded by them. This method is impractical and only applicable to static 
stationary networks. 
Song et al [25] have proposed a wormhole discovery mechanism based on statistical 
analysis of multipath routing. They observed that a link created by a wormhole is very attractive 
in routing sense, and thus will be selected and requested with high frequency. These factors allow 
for easy integration of this method into intrusion detection systems. But this method can only 
work with protocols that are both on-demand and multipath. 
Ritesh et al [27] have proposed a detection algorithm that uses only connectivity 
information to look for forbidden substructures in the connectivity graph. It is completely 
localized and, unlike many techniques proposed in the literature, does not use any special 
hardware artifact or location information, making the technique universally applicable. It is also 
independent of wireless communication models. This approach provides a sufficiently high 










AODV ROUTING PROTOCOL 
The AODV (Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector) routing protocol is a dynamic, self-
starting, multi-hop reactive protocol between mobile nodes wishing to establish and maintain an 
ad hoc network. AODV does not need the participating mobile nodes to store the routes that are 
not in active communication on the routing table. It responds to link breakages and changes in the 
network topology over time and thus adapts to varying ad-hoc network needs. AODV is an 
efficient reactive routing protocol that broadcasts only route discovery packets and thus works 
well with a high node density mobile network. Like all the other routing protocols, AODV is also 
vulnerable to attacks and to increase its reliability as a protocol, the simplest solution is to add 
sophisticated algorithms to the nodes using the protocol [26]. 
AODV maintains connection only to the immediate neighbors broadcasting HELLO 
messages periodically. If a node fails to receive a HELLO message from a neighbor, then a link 
break is detected. The message packets are of three types, RREQ, RREP and RERR. They are 
used for broadcasting route requests, sending or receiving route replies and for reporting error 
messages respectively.  
A RREQ packet consists of the following fields: 
<Source address, source sequence number, broadcast id, destination address, destination sequence 




The node seeking a route to the destination is called the requesting node. The requesting 
node initially broadcasts a RREQ to all of its adjacent nodes once, to find a route to the 
destination node. The node receiving the RREQ can either be the destination node or an 
intermediate node. If the node has not received this RREQ before, is not the destination node and 
does not have a current route to the destination node, then this node rebroadcasts the RREQ to its 
set of neighbors. On the other hand, if the node receiving the RREQ is the destination node or has 
a current route to the destination in its route table, then this node generates a RREP message, 
which is unicasted to the requesting node in a hop-by-hop fashion. A RREP packet has the 
following fields: 
<Source address, destination address, destination sequence number, lifetime, hop count> 
When a RREQ is received at each intermediate node, a reverse path is created to the 
requesting node. When the destination node is found, the RREP will travel through this path, thus 
eliminating the need for any more broadcasts. While the RREP message propagates, a forward 
path is set up, which the requesting node uses to send its data packets to the destination. This 
includes storing the destination IP address, source IP address, broadcast id, expiration time for 
reverse path route entry and source node’s sequence number. A route is determined when the 
RREQ reaches either the destination itself, or intermediate nodes with a ‘fresh enough’ route to 
the destination. The RREQ’s are rebroadcasted only till the ‘lifetime’ is over. If a destination is 
not found by then, the source node increases the lifespan and repeats the process. Nodes that are 
not along the path are determined by the RREP reverse path and the pointers are deleted after an 
ACTIVE_ROUTE_TIMEOUT of 3000msec.  
 If the data is flowing through the network and a link break is detected, a RERR message 
is sent to the adjacent nodes in a hop-by-hop fashion. A RERR packet has the following fields: 
< Unreachable Destination IP address, Unreachable destination sequence number, destCount> 
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Each intermediate node invalidates routes to any unreachable destination. When the 
requesting node receives this RERR message, it invalidates the route to destination and reinitiates 
route discovery if necessary. A node can broadcast a RERR in 3 situations: 
a. When it receives a data packet, but does not have a route to the destination – the real 
problem is that some other node thinks that the correct route is through this node. 
b.  A node receives a RERR message for a node which is in its route table – then this node 
sends a RERR with all the new nodes which are now unreachable. 
c. A link break is detected with the node’s neighbor – the node checks the route table for 
routes that use the neighbor as the next hop and marks them invalid and then sends a 
RERR with the neighbor and the invalid routes. 
Sequence numbers are the most important feature of AODV. They serve as timestamps 
and removes old and invaluable messages from the network, thus preventing AODV from the 
“counting to infinity” problem faced by other distance vector routing protocols. They allow nodes 
to compare how “fresh” their information on other nodes is. Every time a node sends out any type 
of message it increases its own sequence number. Each node records the sequence number of all 
the other nodes it talks to. A higher sequence numbers signifies a fresher route. This it is possible 
for other nodes to figure out which one has more accurate information. The destination sequence 
number is created by the destination for any route information it sends to requesting nodes. It is 
stored in the route table and is updated when the requesting node receives the RREP message 
with a greater sequence number. After forwarding a RREP, the node can get another RREP which 
is either discarded or forwarded, depending on its destination sequence number: 
a. If sequence number of the new RREP is greater than the stored one, it is forwarded. 
b. If old RREP sequence number is the same as the new one and the new RREP has a 
smaller hop count, then the new RREP is forwarded. 
c. Else, all later arriving RREPs are discarded 
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To understand the working of AODV, consider an example of five mobile nodes as 
shown in Figure1. Node 4 wants to communicate with node 3, but is uncertain of the route. Thus 
4 broadcast RREQ, which is received by its neighbors node 5 and node 1. Node 5 does not have a 
route to node 3. Thus node 5 rebroadcasts RREQ. As node 4 is the only neighbor of node 4, it 
receives the RREQ, but drops it. If node 1 has a sequence number greater than that in the RREQ, 
node 1 discards the RREQ. Otherwise, node 1 updates the sequence number in the route table and 
forwards the RREQ to node 2. Node 2 has a route to node 3; thus replies to node 1 by sending a 
RREP, and establishes a forward path to node 3. Node 1 forwards the RREP from node 2 to node 
4 and establishes a forward path to node 2. Thus the route 4 -> 1 -> 2 -> 3 is confirmed to send 
data from node 4 to node 3.  
Imagine a node 6 in the communication range of Node 1 and Node 2. As shown in Figure 
2, node 1 moves out of network. Suppose node 6 detects it first by not getting any HELLO 
message from node 1and marks the respective route table entry for route as invalid. It sends out 
an RERR with the invalid route which is received by node 2. This is how node 2 comes to know 
from node 6 that node 1 is no longer its neighbor. 
 













4.1 Problem Statement  
The problem is how to respond to an attack such as a wormhole in wireless sensor 
networks when the sensor nodes have limited resources for complex security mechanisms. It is 
important to note that the network can respond to an attacker only if the attacker can be identified. 
The danger is that if an attacker cannot be identified, the response may be directed at a friend 
rather than a foe. Fortunately intrusion detection techniques exist that can identify the 
approximate location of an attacker if not pinpoint the attacker. For example, detecting wormhole 
attacks based on topology information [27] not only detects a wormhole attack, but also identifies 
the place in the network where the wormhole attack is taking place. Similarly, detecting the 
sinkhole attack as proposed by [28] places the location of the attacker. Hence, although the 
approach proposed in this paper cannot be applied if the location in the network of the attacker 
cannot be identified approximately at least, there are many intrusion detection approaches 
reported in the literature that identify the location of the attacker [29]. It is beyond the scope of 
this thesis to investigate the intrusion detection techniques that also identify the location of the 
attacker.  Thus for our work, we assume that an intrusion detection system has already detected 
the attack and the location of the attack. 




- Avoid the attack (the wormhole) 
- Deplete attacker resources 
4.2 Outline of Proposed Approach 
The sensor network should immediately respond to the attacker, once the location of the 
attack has been identified by the intrusion detection system, before the attacker gains control of 
the entire network. The steps in the proposed approach are as follows: 
a. Set up the network -  
A few sensor nodes (sacrificial nodes) are selected by the DRA to perform the 
retaliation process, while other nodes carry normal communication within the network. Then 
the retaliation variables and the steps to defend against the attacker are also loaded into the 
sacrificial nodes by the DRA. The function of the sacrificial nodes is to keep the attacker 
busy in order to deplete the attacker’s resources. 
b. Respond -  
Once the network is set up in step a, the sacrificial nodes perform the actual 
retaliation process. The sacrificial nodes start sending a number of Route requests (RREQ 
packets) to the destination node through the attacker route, in order to keep the attacker busy 
from processing the actual RREQ from the defender node. The retaliation algorithm includes 
a prediction component that predicts the number of route replies (RREP) from the attacker 
route. The faster the replies come back, the more the number of RREQ that have to be sent 
out by the sacrificial nodes. The objective is that the RREP from the destination node through 
the attacker route should not reach the defender before the time of flight measure. If it does, 
then the retaliation is not fully successful; thus a larger number of sacrificial nodes have to be 
selected and the process be repeated, until the attacker is fully overloaded that he is not able 
to process all the RREQ from the defender. 
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c. Detect a change in attacker behavior – 
Even before the sacrificial nodes succeed in retaliating against the attacker, the 






RESPONSE TO A WORMHOLE ATTACK 
A Wormhole attack [30] is a sophisticated attack where the attacker creates a fake path to 
the destination to gain access to the data. It is the technique by which ‘a pair of colluding 
attackers record packets at one location and replay them at another location using a private high 
speed network. The attackers disrupt routing by ‘short circuiting’ the routing flow of packets.  
Wormhole attack is a kind of replay attack that is particularly challenging in WSN to 
defend against. Even if the routing information is confidential, encrypted or authenticated, it can 
be very effective and damaging. An attacker can tunnel a request packet RREQ directly to the 
destination node without increasing the hop-count value. Thus it prevents any other routes from 
being discovered. It may badly disrupt communication as AODV would be unable to find routes 
longer than one or two hops. It is easy for the attacker to make the tunneled packet arrive with 
better metric than a normal multi-hop route for tunneled distances longer than the typical 
transmission range of a single hop. Malicious nodes can retransmit eavesdropped messages again 
in a channel that is exclusively available to attacker. 
A wormhole attack commonly involves two remote malicious nodes shown as X and Y in 
Fig.3 [30]. X and Y both are connected via a wormhole link and they target to attack the 
requesting node S. During the path discovery process, S broadcasts a RREQ to a destination node 




Now the malicious node X receives RREQ forwarded by A. It records and tunnels the 
RREQ via the high-speed wormhole link to its partner Y. Malicious node Y forwards the RREQ 
to its neighbor B. Finally, B forwards it to destination D. Thus, RREQ is forwarded via S-A-X-Y-
B-D. On the other hand, another RREQ packet is also forwarded through the path S-C-D-E-F-G-
D. However, as X and Y are connected via a high speed bus, the RREQ from S-A-X-Y-B-D 
reaches D first. Therefore, destination D ignores the RREQ that reaches later and chooses D-B-A-
S to unicast a RREP packet to the requesting node S. As a result, S chooses S-A-B-D route to 
send data that indeed passes through X and Y malicious nodes that are very well placed compared 
to other nodes in the network.  
Thus, a wormhole attack is not that difficult to set up, but still can be immensely harmful 
for a WSN. Moreover, finding better techniques for detection of wormhole attacks and securing 
AODV against them still remains a big challenge in wireless sensor networks. 
 
 





5.1 Setting up the Network 
   
Figure 4. Network model 
 
This research identifies certain nodes to retaliate against the attacker which are based on the 
following assumptions: It is assumed that the attacker is a sophisticated intelligent attacker and a 
mobile attacker.  It is assumed all nodes have the same communications range. 
 
Figure 5. An illustration of Candidate retaliation nodes 
 
Definition 1: Candidate nodes: these are nodes within transmission range of the attacker that can 
do the retaliation. These nodes also belong to the DRA, which can start the retaliation process. 
Attacker            
DRA          
Sensor node            
Attacker           DRA                        Sensor node               Communication range  
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Definition 2: Sacrificial nodes: these are the nodes selected from the candidate nodes to 
ultimately do the retaliation. An overlap density based selection method chooses these nodes from 
the set of candidate retaliation nodes. 
Identifying the ideal number of sacrificial nodes is presented in section 5.3.  The response model 
will use an overlap density based selection method to distribute the nodes to maximize the 
coverage while retaliation is taking place. The criteria for candidate nodes are specified below.   
5.1.1 Criteria for candidate nodes 
First, the candidate nodes must be able to monitor attackers and also communicate with 
the attackers. Second, DRAs must not be able to communicate directly with the attackers, because 
each DRA has the responsibility of identifying candidate nodes and this communication must be 
hidden from attackers. Therefore, the monitoring range refers to the two-way communication 
between the candidate nodes and the attacker node.  After selecting the sacrificial nodes, the rest 
of the nodes in the network excluding the nodes in the attacking area will operate as normal. 
Other candidate nodes will be set to sleep. 
Since it may be difficult and expensive to retaliate against an attacker, our work uses a 
probabilistic approach to monitor the retaliation process. The probabilistic approach will be 
calculated based on several indicators. These will include factors such as Link Quality Indicator 
(LQI), Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI), and also the probability that a sacrificial node 
is close to the attacker as specified by eq.(3). 
Indicators such as the Link Quality Indicator (LQI) or Received Signal Strength Indicator 
(RSSI) can be used as relative measurements about the reliability of the links between the 
attacker and the sensor node, and between the sensor node and the DRA. Other indicators such as 
success rate, which is defined as the ratio of number of packets sent to number of packets 
received can also be used. The DRA can calculate the reliability from the sensor node to itself 
 
using these indicators. Also th
between the attacker and the DRA, and data from multiple sensor nodes can be used to determine 
the approximate location of 
the location of the attacker. 
Because LQI and/or RSSI are not the only factors to determine if a node can be a 
candidate node, there are additional estimators that affect the 
existence of a sensor node 
approach. One method is to model the supposed probability 
We first measure the probability that nod
neighbors, that is, they are not within direct communications range:
Figure 6. An illustration of two
C is a DRA. Att is an attacker. M is a sacrificial node. A is an intersect
 
From [31] the probability that there is a candidate retaliation node in area A between the 
DRA and attacker is  
 
 
Where                  
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the attacking node relative to the DRA, if there is uncertainty about 
efficiency. The probability of the 
in the overlap region also plays a critical role in 
of the existence of a sensor node
es between the DRAs and attackers as 
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Where r0 is the communication range of the attacker and DRA, x is the distance between the DRA 
and attacker. Figure7 shows the intersection area will increase when the x value decreases. It 
means when x is between r and 2r, as the distance gets shorter, the intersection area will get 
bigger. Then Φ(x) also gets bigger. x cannot be smaller than r since the DRA should not directly 
communicate with the attackers.  In other words, the probability that there is a candidate 
retaliation node in the area A will get bigger if the DRA is close to the attacker but not in the 
attacking area. Also by elementary algebraic calculation, dA/ dx > 0 for x ∈  [r, 2r], it means A is 
a monotonically decreasing function.  
If x is equal to or close to r, the probability that a sacrificial node can be close to the 
attacker will be large. If x is equal or close to 2r, the probability of that will be small.  
Suppose αi  is the probability that a sacrificial node is close to the attacker. Then  
 α	  Φ
     (3)  
Suppose Pi is the probability that a node can be a good sacrificial node which can get the 
command from the DRA and have good communication with the attacker. Pi  is based on one or 
more of the factors mentioned earlier in this chapter, that is, LQI, RSSI and the probability of a 
node existing in the right region. 
Definition 3: Monitoring activity µ (q, t): is the probability that q (the attacker) is within the 
monitoring range of at least one sacrificial node. We assume that the monitoring activity is 
invariant with respect to time, that is, µ (q). 
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Where S(q) denotes the set of all sacrificial nodes. 
From this equation, it shows the higher probability of the sacrificial model running well, the 
bigger the µ (q) value. However if only sensor nodes with a higher Pi  are selected, it will be easy 
for an attacker to detect fraud because it may be possible that the distribution of the nodes is 
uneven. So using the ratio (see below) is the best way to select the sacrificial nodes based on 
density of candidate nodes. 
5.1.2 Response  
Depending on the retaliation algorithm, the DRAs can calculate the number of sacrificial 
nodes needed (section 5.3). A fixed ratio of sacrificial nodes to candidate retaliation nodes is used 
to select the sacrificial nodes. In addition to calculating the number of sacrificial nodes needed, 
each DRA also calculates the number of candidate retaliation nodes. The overlap density based 
selection method sets an invariable ratio that makes the percentage of the sacrificial nodes to 
candidate retaliation nodes unchanged for each DRA and attacker. The ratio can be decided in 
many ways. If the density of sensor nodes is higher, then the ratio can be lower. If the other part 
of the network is collecting important information, increasing the ratio will increase the 
probability of success of the retaliation model.  
The model sets an initial threshold for the total monitoring activity. It also relates with the 
original purpose of the sensor network. If the sensor network is working on sensitive data or the 
attacker has enough intelligence, then the threshold should be set higher. 
After the retaliation process starts, the effective working area of a sacrificial node will 
shrink over time because of declining power levels in the node’s power source. This will cause Pi 
to decline over time. If a sacrificial node’s Pi falls below a certain value, that node cannot be 
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counted on as a sacrificial node anymore. It will not have the ability to finish the retaliation 
process. The node will be placed into a dormant state at the command of the DRA. When the 
probabilistic approach falls below the initial threshold, then reconfiguration takes place. The 
Model will be used to add more sacrificial nodes. 
The total monitoring activity is based on the monitoring activities of the sacrificial nodes 
within each DRA region. Each DRA region will provide a monitoring of: 
  !
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  #
∀∈&!
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  (5)  
where Ci(q) is the set of sacrificial nodes in a DRA i. If a sacrificial node within a DRA ‘dies,’ 
then the monitoring activity of the cluster will be reduced. However, the total monitoring as 
indicated by eq.(5) may still be above the threshold and in such a case there is no need to select a 
new sacrificial node. If the total monitoring is below the threshold, a node selection process takes 
place which is described below.  
5.1.3 Selecting Sacrificial nodes 
 
 
The algorithm for selecting sacrificial nodes is outlined. An overlap density based 
selection method is used to maximize coverage. 
Attacker nodes 
Manipulator nodes 






Algorithm for retaliation model: 
Step 1: The DRAs use context awareness or intrusion detection to determine if there is a 
suspicion of an attack. 
Step 2: If there is a suspicion of an attack, then it will: 
i. Determine which DRAs should respond to defeat the attack – If the DRA within 
communication range of an attacker receives a message from their own nodes and 
from the attacker with the same source and timestamp, then the DRA will not send 
the command to retaliate. Otherwise it would select the sacrificial nodes. Hence the 
attacker cannot overhear the instructions by a DRA. 
ii. Determine nodes m1, m2, …mn (candidate retaliation nodes) within the attacker’s 
communication range. 
iii. Use the overlap density based selection method to distribute the nodes to maximize 
the coverage while retaliation is taking place.  
iv. Send the command to the nodes selected in the last step.  
Step 3: Sacrificial nodes n1, n2, …nn apply retaliation algorithm for manipulating the attacker. 
Step 4: At regular intervals, the total monitoring activity µ (q) of the attacker point q is checked 
by each DRA. If this falls below the threshold, the DRA which has the lowest ratio should add a 
new sacrificial node to do the retaliation. If several DRAs have the same ratio at the same point, 
the DRA which has the smallest ID will be selected to add a new node. The frequency of 
checking is determined by the initial monitoring activity level. 
Step 5: Retaliate until objectives are met or retaliation is not successful. 
5.2 Response Model 
To the defender the objective of retaliation is two-fold:  
• To establish a secure connection between the defender D1 and the destination  
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• To deplete attacker resources 
The objective of the attacker is to launch a wormhole attack by establishing a seemingly natural 
route with the defender and monitor the incoming and outgoing packets to the destination. We 
make an assumption that the attacker cannot modify the underlying AODV routing protocol. 
An attack may not be detected immediately. Therefore, some nodes may start using the 
wormhole path (type A). It is only after the wormhole is detected, the retaliation kicks into action. 
Hence there are two types of nodes involved in the retaliation: 
• Nodes that are communicating normally with the attacker – type A 
• Nodes that send RREQs – these are nodes that were not communicating, but send RREQ 
after the attack is detected – type B 
Type A nodes - nodes a,…,m are nodes that are sending normal data packets.  
Type B nodes – nodes n,…,p are sending RREQ packets on a wormhole attack being detected 
 As the attacker is using a private high speed wormhole link, the RREP from the 
destination node will reach the defender first through the attacker route. Thus the objective of 
Type B nodes is to make sure that the RREP packets from the destination node does not reach the 
defender first through the attacker route. This means that the Type B nodes have to find an 
alternate path for the RREP from the base, other than that through the attacker route. To achieve 
this, given a RREP, we need to find the probability that this RREP is for the RREQ of D1, with 
the assumption that the attacker is able to handle all the packets.   
Probability of response to D1 given attacker is able to handle all packets 
From [32], the maximum per node throughput in a wireless network featuring many-to-one 
communication is upper bounded by W/n bits per sec where W is the transmission capacity of the 
channel and n sources. In our work we assume a worst-case scenario, that is, the upper bound. 
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Let all the packets that go through the attacker be PA. PA therefore includes all the RREQs, 
RREPs and all the data packets.  
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 (7) 
Since D1 sends one RREQ and receives one RREP, 1|	
 is the probability that D1 





    (8) 
Assume each of nodes a,..,m send x packets and there are #( a,..,m) nodes. Therefore the total 
number of packets traveling through the attacker by nodes a,..,m  is x × #( a,..,m). We assume a 
worst case scenario that there are no acknowledgement ACK packets.  
 Nodes n,..,p send one RREQ each and receive one RREP. Total number of packets traveling 
through the attacker is 2 × #( n,..,p) of which #( n,..,p) are RREP packets 
The constraint based on [1] is:   
• x × #( a,..,m)  + 2 × #( n,..,p) = W 
Therefore: 
• each node i ∈{ a,..,m} sends 
66×#8,…,:
;<×#=,…,>
 × 100% of packets   (9) 
• each node j ∈{ n,..,p} sends or receives 
<6×#8,…,:
;<×#=,…,>




 × 100% are RREP packets    (10) 
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Hence we can obtain P(PA) and P(PA|D1RREP) and calculate P(D1RREP|PA) 
From (7) 	




 × 100   
P(D1RREP|PA) decreases as the capacity of the attacker is exceeded, that is,  
x × #( a,..,m)  + 2 × #( n,..,p) ≥ W 
Since x × #( a,..,m)  + 2 × #( n,..,p) ≥ W, that is, x × #( a,..,m)  + 2 × #( n,..,p) = mW, where m 
>1, then, 1|	
 reduces by m, that is, +,3345|*
m  
  Probability measure  A 	+,3345|*
,        if attacker is not overloaded	+,3345|*
B 		m > 1	if attacker is overloaded     D    (11) 
The probability measure gives an indication of the chances of the attacker sending a RREP for 
D1.  
 The selection of the sensor nodes that actually does the retaliation process (sacrificial 
nodes or Type B nodes) depends on the capacity of the attacker. We assume that the capacity of 
the attacker is higher than that of the sensor nodes. But only the attacker is aware of his capacity. 
We estimate the bandwidth/capacity of the attacker, based on which we adjust the number of 
sacrificial nodes. An overlap density based selection method will be used to distribute the 
sacrificial nodes to maximize the coverage while retaliation is taking place. The sacrificial nodes 
must be selected from the overlap region (intersection area) between the clusters surrounding the 
cluster in which the attacker belongs, and thus within the communication range of the attacker.   
As the selected sacrificial nodes keep the attacker busy by sending RREQ packets, its 
power level also reduces. Thus the probability that the node is an effective sacrificial node 
decreases over time and hence the DRA should elect some more sacrificial nodes to complete the 
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retaliation process. This selection is a prediction/learning process meaning that initially some 
number of sacrificial nodes may be selected by the DRA to send RREQ packets to the attacker. If 
the attacker is able to process all the RREQs and send RREPs back within the time of flight 
measure, then the DRA adds more number of sacrificial nodes.   
 It may take time to detect the attack. Therefore some nodes may already be 
communicating with the attacker. Others send RREQ packets when an attack is detected. The 
load at the attacker must be increased if the attacker is able to process all the RREQs that go 
through the attacker’s route, which is shown graphically in Fig. 8.  
 
Figure 8. Packet rate through attacker 
 
The first step in achieving our objective of overloading the attacker is the congestion 
estimator. In order to know if the attacker is at his full capacity, we need to monitor/estimate the 
congestion at the attacker’s area of the network. The congestion may be due to network 
bandwidth being congested or the capacity of the attacker, which is measured in bandwidth. 
After estimating the capacity/bandwidth of the attacker, the next step is to control the 
number of RREQ packets, as shown in Fig. 9, which needs to be sent out by the Type B nodes, in 
order to keep the attacker busy by wasting his resources. 
Capacity/Bandwith       
of attacker 











Figure 9. RREQ Control 
 
From [33] the bandwidth (or congestion) is estimated as:  
EFGH  I1  JKL|M|N O ∗ QFRHSFRH + JKL|M|N ∗ EFG  1H (12) 
B is the estimated bandwidth, L[k] is the number of RREP received, T[k] is the last RREP inter-
arrival, L[k]/T[k] is the rate of the RREP stream, and K is a time constant. k and k - 1 represent the 
actual and the previous values of the variables. 
 Referring to Fig. 8, if the bandwidth is very high, then we are at point X. If the 
bandwidth is low, then we are at point Y. At point Z, we are at bandwidth of zero, which means 
that the attacker is at his full capacity. Below bandwidth of 0, the attacker is overloaded and thus 
1|	
 decreases. Hence we need to calculate the value of m in equation (6) to obtain the 
probability measure. As long as the bandwidth is above 0, our assumption is that all the RREQs 
will be received. However, the probability will be low if many RREQ packets are being sent by 
the sacrificial nodes. 
The bandwidth estimator is used to increase the number of RREQs or sacrificial nodes. 
For example, if the bandwidth estimator says 100bits/sec, then increasing the RREQs by 
50bits/sec (and 50bit/sec for RREPs), will saturate the bandwidth. As the number of sacrificial 
nodes is increased, the new bandwidth is calculated to determine if more sacrificial nodes are 








then all the RREPs will be received. The time window is the time of flight. At the end of this time 
the bandwidth and probabilities are calculated. 
If the bandwidth is high, then the probability of an RREP through the attacker being 
intended for the RREQ from D1 is defined by the first part of equation (11) where the attacker is 
not overloaded. For example, if the bandwidth is 100bits/sec and time of flight is 2 sec, then the 
sacrificial nodes must transmit 200bits or more. If the bandwidth is below zero, shown as red line 
in Figure9, then the probability of any packet is determined by the second part of equation (11) 
where the attacker is overloaded. 
Algorithm for the Response Model 
 Step 1: The defender node D1 notifies all the selected sacrificial nodes to establish a connection 
with the destination node D through the attacker route. 
Step 2a: Learn the attacker pattern. The attacker pattern depends on the number of route replies 
RREPs that come back to the defender node D1 through the attacker route. 
Step 2b: The sacrificial nodes (n... p) send RREQ packets to the destination node D through the 
attacker route. The faster the replies come back, the more the number of route requests that have 
to be sent out by the sacrificial nodes. The probabilistic measure will predict the number of RREP 
packets from the attacker route.  
i. Estimate the capacity/bandwidth of the attacker (Step 3) 
ii. If the probability that the RREP reaches the defender before the time of flight 
measure is high, the attacker is not overloaded. Thus sacrificial nodes send more 
RREQ through the attacker route, to keep him busy. 
iii. Else, the attacker is overloaded; that is the probability that the RREP will reach 
the defender first through the attacker route decreases by a constant factor m. 
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The objective is for the desired path to be found with a high probability, that is, the RREP from 
the attacker is unlikely to be sent to the defender before the time of flight measure. The 
probability measure gives an indication of the chances of the attacker sending a RREP for D1.  
Probability measure A 	+,3345|*
,        if attacker is not overloaded	+,3345|*
B 		m > 1	if attacker is overloaded     D 
Step 3: Estimate the capacity or bandwidth of the attacker 
EFGH  I1  JS|R|T O ∗ UFGHVFGH + JS|R|T ∗ EFG  1H 
i. Time Window is set to the time of flight measure. Calculate bandwidth and 
probabilities in step 2 at the end of this time. 
ii. If bandwidth is high (>0), then the attacker is not overloaded; thus number of 
RREQs or sacrificial nodes is increased to saturate the bandwidth. 
iii. Else, if bandwidth is below zero, attacker is overloaded.  
Step 4a: If an RREP is received by a sacrificial node (n… p), it sends a data packet to the 
destination node D through the attacker route. Send at rate that keeps attacker busy.  
Step 4b: If an RREP is received by the defender node D1, then the retaliation is only partially 
successful. The number of sacrificial nodes is increased as in step 3 and another RREQ is sent. 
Step 5: Defender node D1 sends an actual data packet to destination once the RREP for a route 











6.1 Sensor Network Simulator and Emulator (SENSE) 
To validate our approach, we simulated a wormhole attack and responded to make the 
attacker busy by sending RREQs from the sacrificial nodes, using the simulation tool SENSE 
(Sensor Network Simulator and Emulator) [36]. SENSE was chosen for numerous reasons. It is a 
user-friendly simulator implemented in C++, which has a good compiler support and the 
execution speed is generally faster. With the Standard Template Library, C++ programs can 
easily achieve high efficiency while maintaining a high level of code reuse. SENSE is an efficient 
and powerful sensor network simulator that is also easy to use. Unlike object-oriented network 
simulators, SENSE is based on a novel component-oriented simulation methodology that 
promotes extensibility and reusability to the maximum degree. At the same time, the simulation 
efficiency and the issue of scalability are not overlooked.  
SENSE runs on top of COST, a component based discrete event simulator that is written 
in CompC++, a component extension to C++. The component-port model gives the users a great 
deal of freedom in configuring sensor nodes. It makes simulation models extensible i.e., a new 
component can replace an old one or if they have compatible interfaces and inheritance is not 
required. This also promotes reusability: a component developed for one simulation can be used 
in another if it satisfies the latter’s requirements on the interface and semantics. Components 
interact with each other only via input and output ports, and thus development of a component 
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becomes completely independent of others. An inport implements certain functionality, so it is 
similar to a function. In contrast, an outport defines what functionality it expects out of others 
(abstraction of a function pointer). 
The currently available components and simulation engine in SENSE are given below: 
1. Battery Model: Linear Battery, Discharge Rate Dependent and/or Relaxation Battery 
2. Application Layer : Random Neighbor; Constant Bit Rate 
3. Network Layer: Simple Flooding; a simplified version of ADOV without route repairing, a 
simplified version of DSR without route repairing 
4. MAC Layer: NullMAC; IEEE 802.11 with DCF 
Fig. 10 shows the internals of a typical sensor node [36]. The sensor node is a composite 
component. It consists of a number of smaller primitive components, each implementing certain 
functionality. Normally a sensor node has some layered network protocol components, a power 
component and a battery component both of which are related to power management and others 
such as mobility and sensor. The inports and outports of the sensor node component are directly 
connected to the corresponding inports and outports of internal components. 
  
Figure 10. The internal structure of a typical sensor node 
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6.2 System Specifications 
The proposed solution was implemented on Toshiba Laptop with the following specifications: 
• Processor: Intel Pentium Dual CPU T3400 2.16GHz 
• Installed Memory (RAM): 4.00GB 
• System Type: 64-bit Operating System (Windows 7 Professional) 
To run SENSE, the SSH (Secure Shell) client PUTTY was used to connect to the CentOS 5.6 
Linux server of the Department of Computer Science at Oklahoma State University.   
The following changes were made in the configuration to enable the SENSE simulator to execute 
on the Linux server: 
• The basicDefinitions.mk file was modified to update the compile command to link the 
visualizer library:  
               G++ -Wall –o sim_aodv sim_aodv.cxx ../../libraries/visualizer/lib/libvisualizer.a 
• The compiler flag in definitions.mk file was modified: 
  CCFLAGS += -DVISUAL_ROUTE -DVR_SIZE=30 –fpermissive 
• The path for the linker libraries was updated: 
        LD_SHARED = #-Wl, --rpath –Wl,/usr/lib  
• The development package of Bison (thus bison itself) was installed as the parser 
generator, with the help of the system administrator.  
6.3 Implementation Details 
The proposed solution was implemented and validated by running numerous simulations 
in SENSE. The implementation of the network setup (described in section 5.2), candidate node 
selection (described in section 5.2.1), and sacrificial node selection (described in section 5.2.3) 
are explained in section 6.3.1. The response model of choosing the sacrificial nodes depending on 
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the capacity of the attacker (described in section 5.3) is presented in section 6.3.2. The estimation 
of the attacker’s capacity is presented in section 6.3.3. Finally, the process of finding the 
monitoring activity of response model (described in section 5.2.2) is presented in section 6.3.4.  
6.3.1 Network Setup 
 The network is constructed with approximately 300 sensor nodes. These sensor nodes are 
identical in terms of its resources like power, battery levels etc. The mesh topology was chosen to 
place the sensor nodes at a distance of 100 units. The source and destination were randomly 
selected.  Assuming only one attacker node is present in the wormhole, it is positioned such that 
the route from the source to destination is the shortest path. The power levels of the attacker and 
the rest of the sensor nodes were selected, after various possible tries, such that the path from the 
source to the destination passes through the attacker, creating a wormhole attack. While doing so, 
the communication range of the attacker goes up when compared to that of the rest of the sensor 
nodes. The chosen power level of the attacker was 0.003 dBm, while that of the rest of the sensor 
nodes was 0.0003 dBm. For this selected power levels, the communication range of the attacker 
was 6 times higher than that of the normal sensor nodes.  
The positions of the Distributed Retaliation Agents (DRAs) were selected in such a way 
that their communication ranges overlap with that of the attacker node, in order to select the 
sacrificial nodes from the intersection area. For this work four such DRAs were selected, whose 
communication range was the same as that of the attacker. With these power levels and the 
communication ranges, the total number of candidate nodes in all four of the DRAs was found to 
be 72, which are capable of responding against the wormhole attack. The sacrificial nodes which 
actually respond to the wormhole attack will be selected from this set of 72 candidate nodes, 




6.3.2 Response Model Simulation 
 As the wormhole attack may not be detected immediately, some of the sensor nodes may 
start communicating with the attacker through the wormhole link (Type A). We assume that there 
is one such sensor node that starts communicating with the attacker. The next step is to find the 
required number of sacrificial nodes (Type B) that send RREQs to keep the attacker busy, in 
order to find an alternate path. The ideal situation is to keep increasing the number of sacrificial 
nodes dynamically at runtime, until an alternate path is found. However, in SENSE for a source 
node to communicate with a destination node, a connection needed to be established between 
them before runtime. Hence it was not possible to determine the required number of sacrificial 
nodes dynamically at runtime. Thus to overcome this, for a given power level of the attacker, 
sacrificial nodes were added manually until an alternate path was found. Thus each addition of a 
sacrificial node was a different simulation, until the attacker was not present in the route from 
source to destination node. 
For example, say for the given power level of the attacker, it requires `n’ different 
simulations to get an alternate path. Simulation 1 will have one Type A node to communicate 
with the attacker with no sacrificial nodes at all. Simulation 2 will have two nodes: one Type A 
node and one sacrificial node. Simulation 3 will have three nodes: one Type A node and two 
sacrificial nodes, and so on. Thus each simulation will have one Type A node and an additional 
sacrificial node compared to the previous simulation. 
The above mentioned approach was repeated for five different power levels of the 
attacker: 0.003, 0.0035, 0.004, 0.0045 and 0.005 (dBm). Each of these was a separate simulation 
with different number of sacrificial nodes sending RREQs to the attacker. The number of such 
sacrificial nodes required to keep the attacker busy depends on the power level of the attacker. An 
attacker with a low power level requires fewer sacrificial nodes compared to an attacker whose 
power level is high. For example, for a power of 0.003 dbm, 10 sacrificial nodes are required to 
 
get an alternate path from source to destination, and it requires 30 sacrificial nodes for a power 
level of 0.005 dBm. From this data it was clear that as the power level
the number of sacrificial nodes required to keep the attacker busy also increased. That is, the 
number of sacrificial nodes is 




 The wormhole attacker has a high speed network with which he is able to gain access to 
the information flowing through the network. 
unknown. But the utilization of the attacker can be found, which depends on the number of Route 
Replies (RREPs) that go throu
to keep the attacker busy by sending Route Requests (RREQs) in order to waste his resources. 
The utilization measure determines how busy the attacker is at any given point in time, that is, it 
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attacker, the busier or more congested the attacker is. This means that as the utilization of the 
attacker increases, the attacker won’t be able to process the route requests quickly, and thus an 
alternate path from source to destination can be found.  
For the highest power level of the attacker (0.005 dBm), the time taken to find an 
alternate path from source to destination was 178.589 seconds. The time period in which all the 
RREPs go through the attacker, within 178.589 seconds, was found to be (70.0, 70.3). This time 
frame was divided into 3 intervals, each with a time constant (K) of 0.1 seconds, which is the 
range of the intervals. For each interval, the number of RREPs received by the attacker, the last 
RREP inter-arrival, the rate of RREP stream was calculated. At the beginning, the attacker is at 
his full capacity as his resources are not yet used up. Thus the initial value of his utilization is 
taken to be zero. With these values, the utilization of the attacker was determined at the end of 
each interval as given in Table 2 below.  
As the sacrificial nodes keep sending RREQ packets to the attacker, the attacker starts 
processing those requests, until his bandwidth/capacity is fully overloaded. Thus the utilization of 
the attacker keeps going up, so that at one point he won’t be able to process all the RREQs from 
the sacrificial nodes, which is when an alternate path from source to destination is found. The 
results at the end of each interval obtained from eq.12 are shown in Table 1 and Fig. 12.  
Interval  1 2 3 
# of RREPs (L[k]) 4 25 5 
Last RREP inter-arrival (T[k]) 0.00205 0.00108 0.00447 
Rate of RREP stream (L[k]/T[k]) 1954.14 23203.7 1117.85 
Time Constant (K) 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Previous utilization value (B[k-1]) 0 39.5934 287.827 
Actual utilization value (B[k]) 39.5934 287.827 324.135 
 





Figure 12. Utilization/Congestion Estimation 
 
The aim of the proposed solution is to show that if an attacker gets busier by processing 
the RREQs from the sacrificial nodes, the attacker will not be able to process the RREQ from the 
source and hence an alternate path from the source to the destination is found after the attacker 
gets overloaded. To prove this, the following data were collected from the simulation for the 
highest power level of the attacker (0.005 dBm), and represented graphically below: 
1. The number of packets of all types sent by the attacker (Fig. 13) 
2. The number of packets of all types received by the attacker (Fig. 14) 
3. The total number of packets sent and received by the attacker (Fig. 15) 
4. The time when the attacker is overloaded and when an alternate path is found (Fig. 16)  
The measure of the attacker being overloaded depends on the number of packets sent and 
received by the attacker. Initially when the attacker is at his full capacity, he will be able to send 
out a packet for every packet that he is receiving from other nodes. As the sacrificial nodes are 
sending out Route Requests (RREQs), the attacker gets busier. This is mainly due to the number 

























of the nodes. This can be proved by comparing the graphs in Figure 13 and 14. Thus the attacker 
sends out fewer packets compared to the number of packets he receives, at which time the 
attacker is overloaded or busy enough that he is not able to process the RREQ from the source. 
Due to this, the RREP from the destination reaches the source through a path that does not go 
through the attacker, at which time an alternate path is found.  
For the given power level of 0.005 dBm, as shown in Figure 18, the time when the 
attacker gets overloaded is at 4.9125 seconds. At this time, the attacker sends out only two 
packets, but he receives 57 packets in total. The time when the alternate path is found is shown to 
be 178.543 seconds. The data for two other power levels of the attacker 0.003 dBm and 0.0035 
dBm are given in Appendix A. 
 




























Figure 14. Packets received by the attacker at power level 0.005 
 
 

























































Figure 16. Time when attacker is overloaded and alternate path found at power 0.005 
 
6.3.4 Monitoring Activity of Response Model 
In section 6.3.3 we carried out our experiments for different power levels of the attacker 
node, with all the rest of the nodes, including the sacrificial nodes having the same power levels. 
Now we experiment with different power levels of the sacrificial nodes for one power level of the 
attacker, with the rest of the nodes having the same power level as in previous section (0.0003 
dBm).  As the highest power level of the attacker (0.005 dBm) required 30 sacrificial nodes to 
keep the attacker away from the route between source and destination nodes, we took that 
simulation as a base for the simulations for finding the monitoring activity of the response model. 
Four different simulations with different power levels for the sacrificial nodes were carried out: 
0.0001 dBm, 0.0002 dBm, 0.0006 dBm and random power levels for the sacrificial nodes in the 


































From the results of the simulation in Phase I, for the highest attacker power level of 0.005 
dBm, the time taken to find an alternate path from source to the destination node was calculated 
as 178.589 seconds. The success rate of each of the sacrificial nodes used in the simulation was 
found out. The success rate gives us the ratio between the packets sent by the sacrificial nodes to 
the packets received by them.  
We ran the above mentioned simulations with different power levels of the sacrificial 
nodes, to find the monitoring activity of the attacker, i.e., to check if the attacker is within the 
monitoring range of at least one sacrificial node. As described in chapter 5, the monitoring 
activity of the attacker is directly proportional to the probability of the sacrificial node having 
sufficient resources and being within range. In our case, the probability value was measured as 
the success rate of all the sacrificial nodes used in Phase I. The average of the success rates was 
calculated as 3.08391, which was taken as the initial threshold value for the total monitoring 
activity. 
As the sacrificial nodes continue to respond against the attacker by sending RREQs, their 
effective working area will shrink over time. Thus at some point the success rate of some of the 
sacrificial nodes will fall below the set threshold value. Hence we replace those sacrificial nodes 
with other sacrificial nodes, in order to effectively respond against the attack. We kept repeating 
this, until an alternate path from source to destination node was found. For the different power 
levels of the sacrificial nodes, the number of changes it takes to get an alternate path, the number 
of sacrificial nodes to be changed each time and the total number of nodes changed is shown in 
Table 2. The graphical representation showing the number of nodes changed each time for the 
four power levels of the sacrificial nodes is shown in Fig. 17 and a bar chart showing the total 




Table 2. Phase II Results 
 
                       Power  (dBm)   
# of changes 
0.0001 0.0002 0.0006 0.0001– 
0.0006 
1 15 10 10 8 
2 24 27 18 20 
3 24 29 2 2 
4 29 23   
5 26    
6 3    
Total # of nodes changed 121 89 30 30 
 
 









































Figure 18. Total number of nodes changed for the given power of sacrificial nodes 
 
It is clear from the above results that as the power of the sacrificial nodes increases, the 
number of times we need to change the sacrificial nodes decreases. For each power level, the 
number of nodes changed starts at a low number and then goes up, as the combined power of all 
the sacrificial nodes falls below the threshold value. As we keep changing the sacrificial nodes, 
the combined power of the sacrificial nodes goes above the threshold value, at which point the 
number of nodes to be changed decreases. Also, it is obvious that the total number of nodes 
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 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The network setup in SENSE was composed of 289 nodes. Three nodes were designated 
to be the source, destination and attacker nodes. Four DRA’s were setup yielding a total of 72 
available sacrificial nodes. Due to limitations in SENSE the addition of sacrificial nodes was 
performed manually. The first set of simulations, for modeling the response process, was to study 
the effect of attacker power on the network’s response. The five runs completed showed, as 
expected, that the number of sacrificial nodes needed to respond to an attack is proportional to the 
attacker power. The second set of simulations was to study the effect of the sacrificial node power 
level on the network’s response. The four runs completed proved that the number of node 
changes required to respond to an attack is inversely proportional to the node’s power level.  
The attacker might change his attack pattern, even before the sacrificial nodes succeed in 
responding against the wormhole attack. The study of change in behavior of the attacker is 
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The data collected to support the proposed approach of finding when the attacker is 
overloaded and also when an alternate path is found is presented here for two other power levels 
of the attacker: 0.003 and 0.0035. 
 


























Figure A-2. Packets received by the attacker at power level 0.003 
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Scope and Method of Study:  
Responding to an attacker who has infiltrated a network has received little 
attention. In this thesis we propose an appropriate response model to a wormhole attack 
in sensor networks. The response to the attack will maximize the benefit to the defender 
sensor node by obtaining an alternate path that will avoid the wormhole, thus mitigating 
the effects of the attack. This is achieved by using sacrificial nodes to engage the attacker 
while alternatives are explored by the defender. This approach has the added advantage 
of expending the attacker’s resources and time. A probabilistic response model that 
determines the success of an alternative route being discovered is developed. A 
monitoring scheme is also proposed to ensure that sufficient sacrificial nodes are 
engaging the attacker.   
 
Findings and Conclusions:    
 
The study was validated using the wireless sensor network simulator and emulator 
SENSE. Results show that the wormhole attacker’s presence in the route is eliminated 
when he reaches his maximum utilization or capacity. In addition, as theorized the 
number of sacrificial nodes needed to respond to an attack is directly proportional to the 
attacker’s power and inversely proportional to that of the sacrificial nodes. 
